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USING FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW TO LIMIT
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
LAUREN ANN ROSS†
ABSTRACT
Because the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) can be used to
regulate conduct that has but a tangential connection to the United
States, the statute exemplifies the potential difficulties of applying U.S.
criminal law extraterritorially. The FCPA’s heightened enforcement
environment and the norm of deferred-prosecution agreements that
settle FCPA charges out of court combine to increase the probability
that a foreign individual or firm will be prosecuted under the FCPA
for bribery that occurred in and affected a foreign country. This Note
proposes drawing from the presumption against extraterritoriality, a
concept from foreign relations law, to find a reasonable limit to the
territorial provision of the FCPA, which applies to foreign individuals
and foreign companies that are not listed as issuers in the United
States.

INTRODUCTION
JGC Corporation (JGC), a construction and engineering firm
headquartered in Japan, entered into a deferred-prosecution
agreement with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) on
1
April 6, 2011. As part of the agreement, JGC agreed to pay a fine of
more than $200 million and to waive certain rights as a criminal
defendant in the United States in exchange for a deferredprosecution agreement that would most likely lead to
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1. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00260
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/jgc-corp/
04-6-11jgc-corp-dpa.pdf.
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nonprosecution. The proceedings in the Southern District of Texas
stemmed from an alleged violation of U.S. law that began in Europe
3
and occurred in Nigeria. The U.S. law at issue was the Foreign
4
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which criminalizes bribery of foreign
officials for commercial gain.
In the affair, JGC and three joint-venture partners used
European and Asian agents to pay bribes to obtain construction
5
contracts for a project in Nigeria (the Bonny Island Project). One of
the joint-venture partners, Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc. (KBR),
corresponded regarding the Bonny Island Project through facsimiles
6
and e-mails from its Houston, Texas, headquarters, and funds were
electronically routed through New York when agents wired money
7
from Dutch to Swiss bank accounts. Once the Bonny Island Project
bribery came to light, the DOJ initiated investigations of all of the
8
joint-venture partners and involved individuals. JGC initially refused

2. Id. at 2. The agreement required JGC to pay a $218.8 million penalty, take remedial
measures to improve its corporate-compliance program, and cooperate in ongoing DOJ
investigations. Id. at 3–8. Nonprosecution agreements allow prosecutors to file charges and then
put those charges on hold for a period of time while exacting fines and instituting internal
compliance programs. Eugene Illovsky, Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The
Brewing Debate, CRIM. JUSTICE, Summer 2006, at 36, 36. There is disagreement about the
fairness and efficacy of deferred-prosecution and nonprosecution agreements for corporate
compliance. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853,
859–61 (2007) (arguing that deferred-prosecution agreements are an effective means of
achieving reform within corporations but that they may lead to prosecutorial overreaching);
Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 312–13 (2007) (discussing the “gap in the constitutional protections
afforded those individual defendants” that are subject to deferred-prosecution agreements).
3. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, Attachment A at 10–17.
4. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o, 78dd-1 to -3 (2006 & Supp. IV
2011).
5. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, Attachment A at 2, 7.
6. Id. Attachment A at 8, 10, 16.
7. Id. Attachment A at 10.
8. E.g., id. at 1; Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Tesler, No. 4:09-cr-00098 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 11, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tesler/tesler_
plea_agmt.pdf; Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, United States v. Snamprogetti Neth.
B.V., No. 4:10-cr-00460 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/snamprogetti/07-07-10snamprogetti-dpa.pdf; Deferred Prosecution Agreement
at 1, United States v. Technip S.A., No. 4:10-cr-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/technip-sa/06-28-10-technip-agreement.pdf;
Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. 4:09-cr-00071 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kelloggb/02-1109kbr-plea-agree.pdf; Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Stanley, No. 4:08-cr-00597 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/stanleya/09-0308stanley-plea-agree.pdf.
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to cooperate because it felt that the United States lacked jurisdiction,
but the Japanese company later acquiesced and signed the offered
10
agreement. Each entity that was implicated eventually signed a
11
deferred-prosecution or plea agreement with the government; in
total, the DOJ collected more than $1.5 billion in fines from the
12
companies that participated in the Bonny Island Project bribery.
How was a Japanese company haled into court in Texas for
conduct—bribing foreign officials to obtain business—that was
initiated in Europe, the effects of which were felt in Africa, and that
had only a tangential connection to the United States? The DOJ
relied on a combination of two U.S. connections to establish U.S.
jurisdiction: (1) that JGC possessed vicarious liability through agency
13
relationships with an American joint-venture partner, and (2) that
wire transfers through New York banks served as a territorial act in
14
furtherance of the crime. To understand the potential significance of
these connections, it is necessary to understand the FCPA’s
9. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, at 3.
10. Id. at 1, 3.
11. See supra note 8.
12. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, JGC Corp. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Investigation and Agrees To Pay a $218.8 Million Criminal Penalty (Apr. 6, 2011), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-431.html.
13. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, Attachment A at 8 (“Officers,
employees, and agents of JGC . . . and their co-conspirators willfully used the mails and means
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of the authorization,
promise, and payment of bribes to Nigerian government officials pursuant to the scheme.
Stanley, other officers, employees, and agents of KBR, and other co-conspirators committed
acts in furtherance of the scheme in Houston, Texas, and elsewhere in the United States.”).
Joint-venture partners are considered agents of one another and can thus be held liable for the
FCPA violations of another partner. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 65 (2d ed. 2010). This joint liability extends from
the common comparison of joint ventures to partnerships. See, e.g., In re Groff, 898 F.2d 1475,
1475 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[R]ules governing partners’ interests in partnership assets also apply to
joint ventures.”); 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures § 24 (2004) (“As in a partnership, in respect of their
mutual rights and liabilities, each member of a joint venture has the dual status of principal for
himself or herself and agent for his or her associates within the scope of the enterprise.”).
14. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, Attachment A at 16–17
(“[E]mployees, agents, and co-conspirators of JGC willfully . . . caused the commission of FCPA
violations by KBR, a domestic concern within the meaning of the FCPA, by aiding and abetting
KBR in causing wire transfers of $39.8 million from [the joint venture’s] bank account in
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, via a correspondent bank account in New York, New York, to a
[Swiss] bank account . . . , intending that the money would be used, in whole or in part, to pay
bribes to Nigerian government officials.”). Although the deferred-prosecution agreement
focuses on wire transfers through New York as a possible alternative basis for jurisdiction, the
agreement’s cover does not cite the FCPA’s territorial provision. See id. at 1 (listing only 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006)).

ROSS IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

448

10/19/2012 9:40 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
15

[Vol. 62:445

16

structure. The FCPA’s antibribery provisions apply to three classes
of persons: 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 applies to issuers of securities on U.S.
17
18
exchanges; § 78dd-2 applies to domestic concerns; and § 78dd-3
applies to all other persons or entities when acting within the United
19
States. Each section also provides for vicarious liability for
20
companies whose agents or employees violate the provision.
21
22
Because JGC was neither an issuer nor a domestic concern, it was
subject only to § 78dd-3—which provides for jurisdiction over acts
23
that occur within the United States, that is, territorial jurisdiction —
24
as well as the FCPA’s vicarious-liability provisions.
Prosecutions under the FCPA of companies like JGC—
companies that are incorporated and headquartered in foreign
countries and that do not issue stock on American exchanges—pose
challenging questions regarding the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law. Although the prosecutors, as members of the executive
branch, theoretically consider foreign-policy implications of their

15. For more information on the structure of the FCPA, see infra Part I.A.
16. The FCPA also contains recordkeeping requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2006).
17. Id. § 78dd-1 (2006). This section applies to companies that are considered “issuers”
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011), which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l, and to companies that are required
to file reports under section 15(d) of the 1934 Act, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). The
1934 Act defines an “issuer” as “any person who issues or proposes to issue any security.” Id.
§ 78c(a)(8). A “person” is “a natural person, company, government, or political subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of a government.” Id. § 78c(a)(9).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. Domestic concerns include U.S. citizens and residents, as well as
companies incorporated under U.S. law. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1).
19. Id. § 78dd-3. For a detailed discussion of what it means to act within the United States,
see infra Part II.A.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a); see also supra note 13.
21. See Foreign Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S. Securities & Exchange
Commission, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
internatl/foreigngeographic2010.pdf (listing foreign companies registered as issuers in 2010);
Foreign Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 31, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/
foreignalpha2004.pdf (listing foreign issuers in 2004, the last year of the alleged criminal bribery
in the Bonny Island Project case).
22. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, Attachment A at 2.
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (stating that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person other than
an issuer . . . or a domestic concern . . . while in the territory of the United States, . . . to do
any . . . act in furtherance of” the crime of bribing a foreign official (emphasis added)).
24. See id. (stating that “[i]t shall be unlawful for . . . any officer, director, employee, or
agent of such person or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such person, while in the
territory of the United States, . . . to do any . . . act in furtherance of” the crime of bribing a
foreign official).
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enforcement decisions, broad application of the FCPA to foreign
companies in practice has the potential to contravene international
jurisdictional norms and seriously implicate American foreign
25
policy. The pressure upon international defendants such as JCG to
settle is so high that companies may acquiesce to a non- or deferredprosecution agreement, even if their actions may fall beyond the
scope of the law or the jurisdiction of the DOJ or the Securities and
26
Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce the law. Furthermore,
these questions are especially pressing in a context of increasingly
27
aggressive enforcement patterns. Clearly defined limits to the
agencies’ jurisdiction would solve this potentially politically sensitive
problem.
This Note’s two goals are to describe the current state of the law
28
and to delineate the outer boundaries of justifiable jurisdiction over
foreign companies whose actions occur extraterritorially. It concludes
with a proposed interpretation of what this Note calls the territorial
provision, § 78dd-3, which would restrict the FCPA’s application to
actions that have only a tangential territorial connection to the
United States, by using the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Unlike the text of the rest of the antibribery provisions of the FCPA,
§ 78dd-3 specifically includes an element of territoriality in its
29
application to nonissuers and nondomestic concerns. This territorial
provision, ambiguous in a simple textual or purposive analysis, finally
gains an appropriate meaning when viewed in light of the
longstanding presumption against extraterritoriality. This proposed

25. See H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Government’s Campaign
Against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 407, 521 (1999) (“Congress
recognized that this exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction risked offending the sovereignty of
other nations and the concomitant harm to U.S. international relations.”). For more information
on the foreign-policy effects of extraterritorial application of American law, see generally David
H. Small, Managing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Problems: The United States Government
Approach, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283, 285–87 (1987).
26. These two agencies have joint responsibility for enforcement of the FCPA. DEMING,
supra note 13, at 4.
27. See infra notes 99–108 and accompanying text.
28. In this Note, the term “jurisdiction” refers to the scope of the conduct that the FCPA
actually proscribes, rather than a court’s authority to hear a case brought under the statute. For
a more detailed explanation of jurisdiction and the FCPA, see infra Part I.B. For a more
detailed discussion of the concepts of territoriality and jurisdiction, see infra Part III.A.
29. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (stating that the proscribed conduct must occur within the
territory of the United States), with id. § 78dd-1 (lacking such a territorial requirement). For
more explanation, see supra notes 17–24.
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reading removes significant foreign-policy concerns and provides
clarity to a law that is ambiguous as currently applied.
Part I provides the necessary background for this Note’s analysis.
It begins with a detailed description of the FCPA’s provisions. The
remainder of Part I discusses the FCPA’s origins in the wake of the
Watergate scandal, the legislative history surrounding its 1977
enactment and subsequent revisions, and current enforcement
patterns. Part II lays out the basic interpretive methods relevant to
imposing limits on the application of the FCPA’s antibribery
30
provisions. It applies traditional statutory-interpretation techniques
to the question of the FCPA’s extraterritoriality, examining the plain
meaning of the statute’s text and also analyzing the statute’s
legislative history, including the history of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
31
Business Transactions (OECD Convention). Both interpretive
methods establish as ambiguous the degree of territoriality required
to trigger § 78dd-3, necessitating Part III’s turn to foreign relations
law, the study of the interrelation between U.S. and international
32
law. This Part examines the FCPA’s relationship to international law
and places the FCPA within the broader American jurisprudence
regarding extraterritoriality. It identifies several interpretive canons
from foreign relations law and explains why the presumption against
extraterritoriality should apply to the FCPA’s jurisdictional questions.
Although foreign relations law seems inherently relevant to an
analysis of the FCPA’s jurisdiction over foreign entities, it has been

30. This analysis focuses on the antibribery provisions of § 78dd-1 to § 78dd-3, rather than
the more nebulous recordkeeping provisions contained in § 78m(b). The antibribery provisions
mirror more closely the standard actus reus requirement of a criminal offense, whereas the
accounting provisions impose an affirmative duty on companies that register to issue and
conduct transactions with securities on American exchanges under section 12 of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78l (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
31. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, done
Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).
32. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES
& MATERIALS, at xix (2d ed. 2006) (“This casebook examines the constitutional and statutory
law that regulates the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. The topics covered include the
distribution of foreign relations authority between the three federal branches, the relationship
between the federal government and the states in regulating foreign relations, and the status of
international law in U.S. courts.”).
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33

largely missing from current scholarship. Therefore, this Note adds a
new, largely theoretical approach to answering questions about the
legal limits of the FCPA’s jurisdictional reach.
I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: CONTENT, HISTORY,
AND PRESENT ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT
This Part provides background information, providing context
for subsequent layers of interpretive techniques. Part I.A treats the
history and content of the FCPA in depth, focusing on the antibribery
provisions. It sets out the elements of the crime and discusses the
origins of the FCPA in the fallout from the Watergate scandal of the
early 1970s. It then traces the legislative history of the original 1977
enactment through the 1988 and 1998 amendments. Part I.B begins by
describing why the FCPA poses significant jurisdictional questions.
Part I.B also explains various theories under which regulators may
pursue foreign entities for foreign conduct that violates the FCPA.
A. Background: Text and Purpose
1. Origins of the FCPA. Instances of overseas commercial
bribery surfaced in the wake of the Watergate scandal, spurring
34
Congress to enact the world’s first anticorruption statute, the FCPA,

33. See, e.g., Henry Klehm III, Joan E. McKown & Emily A. Posner, Securities
Enforcement Has Crossed the Border: Regulatory Authorities Respond to the Financial Crisis
with a Call for Greater International Cooperation, but Where Will That Lead?, 13 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 927 (2011) (leaving extraterritoriality out of a discussion of regulators’ “increased efforts to
combat corruption and bribery at a global level”); Roger M. Witten, Kimberly A. Parker, Jay
Holtmeier & Thomas J. Koffer, Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery Controls in Pharmaceutical and
Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. LAW. 691 (2009) (lacking significant discussion of jurisdiction
despite giving “practical advice on the compliance programs”). But see Matt A. Vega, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope of Private Whistleblower
Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 487–500 (2009) (including a thorough
analysis of jurisdictional issues when arguing that section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006), should be interpreted to protect FCPA whistleblowers).
Scholarship on the FCPA has been heavily practitioner-focused, with the vast majority of the
seven hundred secondary sources on the subject written for practicing lawyers rather than for
scholars. Most of the relevant materials were found in the form of continuing legal education
materials, newsletters, and texts and treatises as opposed to law-review articles (data found
through Westlaw searches conducted on January 4, 2012).
34. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 87 (2007); Arthur F. Matthews, Internal Corporate
Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 662 (1984).
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in 1977. The new law prohibited businesses and their agents and
36
employees from making payments or gifts to foreign officials. Earlier
in the decade, dozens of large American companies had voluntarily
disclosed to the SEC that they had made bribes that helped them
37
obtain business in a number of foreign countries. The 1976 report
issued by the SEC, Report of the Securities Exchange Commission on
38
Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices,
39
disclosed past bribery and provided the impetus for the FCPA. The
SEC report contained information about SEC investigations, revealed
the widespread practice of commercial bribery of foreign public
officials, and analyzed eighty-nine disclosures of questionable
40
payments. More than three hundred American companies were
41
implicated.
During this period before the FCPA was enacted, the SEC
brought public enforcement actions for illicit payments to foreign
officials against well-known companies, such as Gulf Oil, Phillips
42
Petroleum, General Tire & Rubber, Lockheed, and United Brands.
Enforcement continued after the FCPA was enacted with actions
against Boeing, International Telephone & Telegraph, Page Airways,
43
Firestone Tire & Rubber, and International Systems & Controls.
The most famous scandal, dubbed “Bananagate,” involved a $1.25
million payment by United Brands to the president of Honduras to

35. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o, 78dd-1 to -3 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
36. Id. §§ 103–104, 91 Stat. at 1494–98 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -2
(2006)).
37. Lucinda A. Low, Owen Bonheimer & Negar Katirai, Enforcement of the FCPA in the
United States: Trends and the Effects of International Standards, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 2008: COPING WITH HEIGHTENED ENFORCEMENT RISKS 711, 715 (PLI Corp.
L. & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1665, 2008).
38. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES
(1976).
39. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1–2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4099; see also
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 38, at 57 (“[T]he question of illegal or questionable
payments is obviously a matter of international concern, and the Commission, therefore, is of
the view that limited-purpose legislation in this area is desirable in order to demonstrate clear
Congressional policy with respect to a thorny and controversial problem.”).
40. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1–2, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4099.
41. Id. at 3, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4101.
42. Matthews, supra note 34, at 664.
43. Id. at 664–65.
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44

avoid an export duty on bananas. According to a contemporary
commentator, the revelations of these payments “[shook] foreign
governments, rocked American corporate management, and
tarnished the image of American private enterprise both at home and
45
abroad.”
It was thus in response to these illicit payments made by
American companies that the original version of the FCPA was
46
passed in 1977. The Senate report on the bill that became the FCPA
states that the bill “[m]akes it a crime for U.S. companies to bribe a
47
foreign government official.” The original version of the FCPA only
48
49
applied to issuers and domestic concerns. Since the original
enactment, Congress amended the FCPA twice, each time in
response to concerns that the prohibition on payments to foreign
officials was a significant burden on American businesses vis-à-vis
50
their foreign competitors.
2. Contents of the FCPA. The FCPA, part of the Securities
51
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), is divided into two parts: the
antibribery provisions, which make it a crime to bribe foreign
52
officials, and the accounting provisions, which impose upon
53
companies various bookkeeping obligations. The former follow the
traditional pattern of a crime, with a requisite actus reus and mens
54
whereas the latter impose affirmative obligations on
rea,
55
companies. Companies that are defined as issuers under section 12

44. John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1116 (1977).
45. Charles R. McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An Antitrust
Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215, 215 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
46. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1495 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o, 78dd-1 to -3 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
47. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4100.
48. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 § 103, 91 Stat. at 1495–96 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78dd-1 (2006)).
49. Id. § 104, 91 Stat. at 1496–98 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006)).
50. See infra Part I.A.3.
51. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
52. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
53. Id. § 78m(b).
54. See, e.g., id. § 78dd-1(a) (describing what constitutes the prohibited act of bribing a
foreign official); id. § 78dd-1(f)(2) (defining the mental culpability required to violate the
FCPA).
55. See id. § 78m(b)(2) (requiring issuers to, inter alia, “make and keep books, records, and
accounts” and “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls”).
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of the 1934 Act or that are required to file reports subject to section
57
58
15(d) of the 1934 Act are subject to both sets of provisions.
59
Individuals may also be prosecuted for criminal acts of bribery.
The antibribery provisions are composed of three separate
sections, each regulating different types of entities. The first section,
60
§ 78dd-1, applies to issuers, which consist of foreign and domestic
companies that are publicly listed on U.S. stock exchanges or that are
required to register with the SEC pursuant to other provisions of the
61
1934 Act. The second section, § 78dd-2, proscribes bribery
committed by “domestic concerns,” who are nonissuers that are U.S.
citizens, nationals, or residents as well as companies that are either
incorporated in the United States or that have their principal place of
62
business in the United States. Sections 78dd-1 and 78dd-2 both
contain “alternative jurisdiction” provisions that specifically proscribe
issuers’ and domestic concerns’ acts of bribery that occur outside of
63
the United States. The final section, § 78dd-3, regulates the conduct
of entities not covered by § 78dd-1 or § 78dd-2, including foreign
64
citizens, residents, and corporations. Unlike the first two provisions,
65
§ 78dd-3 specifically states that it has only territorial application. It
requires that acts that further the crime occur “while in the territory of
66
the United States.”

56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78l.
57. Id. § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o.
58. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m(b)(2), 78o(d), 78dd-1 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
59. Each section applies to “any officer, director, employee, or agent” of the issuer,
domestic concern, or other entity. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
60. See id. § 78j-1(f) (defining the term “issuer”).
61. Id. § 78dd-1.
62. Id. § 78dd-2.
63. Id. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i). This type of alternative jurisdiction rests on the
“nationality” principle of jurisdiction, which allows states to “exercise prescriptive jurisdiction
over their own nationals, even when they are located outside national territory.” JEFFREY L.
DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS,
PROCESS 346 (3d ed. 2010); see also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 433, 442–43 (1932)
(holding a U.S. citizen living in France guilty of contempt of court in the United States based
upon this principle).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a).
65. Id. This section does not have a similar alternative-jurisdiction provision for
extraterritorial application. See id. § 78dd-3.
66. Id. § 78dd-3(a) (emphasis added). More fully, § 78dd-3 states that “[i]t shall be unlawful
for any person . . . while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in furtherance of”
the crime. Id.
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To violate the FCPA’s antibribery provisions, all elements of the
crime—which are identical for each of the three sections—must be
met. The actor must (1) commit an act in furtherance of (2) “an offer,
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment” (3) “of
any money, or offer, gift” or “the giving of anything of value to”
(4) “any foreign official” (5) for a listed corrupt purpose that aids the
actor “in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing
67
business to, any person.” The listed purposes include influencing a
foreign-government actor’s official decisions, inducing a foreign
official to do or to omit to do an act that violates the law, “securing
any improper advantage,” or inducing a foreign official to use his or
her influence to affect the decision of a foreign government or
68
instrumentality. Furthermore, the law proscribes payments for
similar purposes to foreign political parties, party officials, or
69
candidates for office. The FCPA also makes it unlawful to pay a
third party “while knowing that all or a portion of such money or
thing of value” will be given to a foreign official to gain a business
70
advantage.
All three provisions contain the additional qualification that the
actor must “make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
71
interstate commerce corruptly.” This requirement, however, need
not be met when invoking the alternative-jurisdiction provisions,
which establish “nationality” jurisdiction for issuers’ or domestic
concerns’ actions abroad regardless of the interstate-commerce
72
nexus. In addition to making use of interstate commerce corruptly,
nonissuer nondomestic concerns must also commit an act “in the
73
territory of the United States.” The FCPA also contains several
exceptions or affirmative defenses that allow an actor to escape
74
liability for what would otherwise be an illegal act of bribery.
67. Id. § 78dd-2(a). The elements of the crime are the same in the other sections. Id.
§§ 78dd-1, -3.
68. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), -2(a)(1), -3(a)(1).
69. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(2), -2(a)(2), -3(a)(2).
70. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), -2(a)(3), -3(a)(3).
71. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a).
72. Id. §§ 78dd-1(g), -2(i); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a).
74. The major exception covers “facilitating or expediting payment[s]” with the purpose of
simply hastening or “secur[ing] the performance of a routine governmental action.” Id. §§
78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b). Some commentators argue, however, that prosecutors and
practitioners have read this exception narrowly, so that it applies only in very limited
circumstances. See, e.g., F. Joseph Warin, Charles Falconer & Michael S. Diamant, The British
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3. The FCPA’s Subsequent History. The FCPA was first
amended by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of
75
1988, enacted as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
76
Act of 1988. The amendments attempted to address the public
perception that the FCPA placed American businesses at a
77
disadvantage in the world marketplace. Despite this concern, the
amendments did not attempt to regulate the conduct of foreign
78
persons through domestic criminal law. Ten years later, Congress
amended the FCPA again, this time to prepare the United States for
79
accession to the OECD Convention through the International Anti80
Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.
The OECD Convention is a binding treaty implemented via the
81
respective domestic anticorruption laws of its thirty-nine signatory
82
states. The United States provided the impetus for the OECD

Are Coming!: Britain Changes Its Law on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight
Against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 42 (2010) (“The area of facilitating payments is a
particularly thorny one for FCPA compliance. . . . [M]any practitioners increasingly fear that
U.S. regulators have simply read the exception out of the statute.”). Additionally, an affirmative
defense covers payments and gifts that are “lawful under the written laws . . . of the foreign
official’s . . . country.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), -2(c)(1), -3(c)(1). Another affirmative defense
applies to a payment or gift that was “a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel
and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official . . . and was directly related
to” promoting or showing products or services or the performance of a contract with the foreign
government. Id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), -2(c)(2); -3(c)(2).
75. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, subtit.
A, pt. I, §§ 5001–5003, 102 Stat. 1415 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1 to -2,
78ff (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
76. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
77. Beverley H. Earle, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: The Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act’s Focus on Improving Investment Opportunities, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
549, 551–52 (1989). At that time, the FCPA was still the world’s only foreign anticorruption law,
more than a decade after its enactment. Id. at 552.
78. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988 §§ 5001–03, 102 Stat. at 1415–
25.
79. Low et al., supra note 37, at 715; see also 144 CONG. REC. 27,653 (1998) (statement of
Sen. Conrad Burns) (“The amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) [were]
approved by the Senate today, to implement in the United States the OECD Convention . . . .”);
144 CONG. REC. 27,350 (1998) (statement of Rep. Thomas Bliley, Jr.) (“This legislation is
designed to help level the playing field for American companies doing business overseas.”).
80. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006)).
81. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, supra note 31, arts. 1–10, 37 I.L.M. at 4–6.
82. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of April 2012, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/
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Convention, encouraging other developed nations to adopt similar
antibribery laws so that American businesses regulated by the FCPA
83
would not be significantly disadvantaged in the world marketplace.
Although important parts of the OECD Convention are patterned
84
after the FCPA, the United States still had to modify its existing
domestic law to ensure compliance with certain treaty sections,
including Article 4, which is the OECD Convention’s provision on
85
jurisdiction. This article states that a signatory shall “take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the
bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is committed in
whole or in part in its territory” and prosecute its own nationals for
acts conducted abroad to bribe foreign officials if the country allows
86
such extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The 1998 amendments to the FCPA, which implemented the
OECD Convention, introduced the alternative jurisdiction sections to
§ 78dd-1 and § 78dd-2, which explicitly call for extraterritorial
87
application. Section 78dd-3 broadened the FCPA’s reach beyond
88
issuers and domestic concerns for the first time. Congress expanded
the FCPA’s application primarily, if not solely, in response to the

briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/40272933.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
Recent scholarship suggests that only four nations have actively enforced its provisions, while
another twenty ratifying nations have conducted little or no enforcement. Developments in the
Law—Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1285 (2011).
83. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 10 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-105hrpt802/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt802.pdf (“Beginning in 1989, the U.S. government began
an effort to convince our trading partners at the OECD to criminalize the bribery of foreign
public officials. Achieving comparable prohibitions in other developed countries and combating
corruption generally has been a major priority of the U.S. business community, the U.S.
Congress, and successive Administrations since the late 1970s.”); see also id. (“[The 1998]
legislation, coupled with implementation of the OECD Convention by our major trading
partners, is designed to result in a substantial leveling of the playing field for U.S. businesses.”).
84. See Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, The 1998 OECD
Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business
Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 486 (2000) (“An important component of the Convention is
its emulation of the corporate accountability approach of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) to detect corrupt payments.” (citations omitted)).
85. See infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
86. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, supra note 31, art. 4, 37 I.L.M. at 5. If an act occurs for which multiple signatory
nations could have jurisdiction, the parties are to consult to determine the best country to
prosecute the corruption. Id.
87. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
§§ 2–3, 112 Stat. 3302, 3302–05 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g), -2(d) (2006)).
88. Id. § 4, 112 Stat. at 3306–09 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2006)).
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89

OECD Convention requirements. In fact, when enacting these
jurisdictional expansions, Congress paid special attention to do so
only “when consistent with national legal and constitutional
90
principles.”
B. Extraterritoriality and the FCPA
The FCPA presents particular problems that arise from
extraterritoriality because it regulates conduct abroad, lacks certain
delineation of its scope, and is actively enforced. This Section first
explains why these three qualities make the FCPA particularly
problematic in the extraterritorial context and then turns to the
various jurisdictional theories that would bring foreign companies and
individuals under the law’s scope.
1. Problems Arising from Extraterritorial Application of the
FCPA. First, FCPA prosecutions have the potential to spark foreignrelations tensions. Any prosecution of a foreign corporation can have
significant policy implications, including “host country resentment”
91
and “transnational tension and strife.” FCPA prosecutions have the
potential to be especially controversial because the FCPA regulates
conduct with an international effect, so the connection that creates an
American interest in foreign corporations’ activities abroad is often
92
particularly tenuous. To compound the issue, enforcement against

89. See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2–3 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-105srpt277/pdf/CRPT-105srpt277.pdf (“[T]he OECD Convention calls on parties to
cover ‘any person’; the current FCPA covers only issuers with securities registered under the
1934 Securities Exchange Act and ‘domestic concerns.’ The Act, therefore, expands the FCPA’s
coverage to include all foreign persons who commit an act in furtherance of a foreign bribe
while in the United States.” (quoting Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 31, art. 1(1), 37 I.L.M. at 4; and
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1994))).
90. See id. at 3 (“This exercise of jurisdiction over U.S. businesses and nationals for
unlawful conduct abroad is consistent with U.S. legal and constitutional principles . . . . It is
within the constitutional grant of power to Congress to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations’ and to ‘define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations.’” (last alteration in
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 10)).
91. Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20
MICH. J. INT’L L. 419, 433 (1999).
92. See H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 240 (2001) (“[E]nlargement of the extraterritorial effect of the
[FCPA’s] antibribery provisions may prove to be the most significant and challenging foray by
the United States into the regulation of international business . . . .”); id. at 358–59 (“[T]he
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foreign entities has become a new norm; eight of the ten largest
93
FCPA settlements in American history involve foreign companies.
Second, deferred-prosecution agreements have become the norm
in FCPA actions, which has led to a dearth of judicial guidance on the
94
FCPA’s jurisdictional scope. Companies shy away from litigating
FCPA violations because of uncertainty, expense, and the potential
95
for reputational harm. Because most companies settle with the DOJ
96
or SEC, the judiciary rarely produces opinions on the FCPA. As a
result, “a multitude of legal issues associated with the FCPA have yet
to be subject to judicial review,” and courts may interpret key
provisions differently from the way that the DOJ and SEC have
97
previously presented them. In light of this phenomenon, one district

jurisdictional reach of the amended FCPA with regard to foreign nationals extends to virtually
any contact with the United States, however glancing.”).
93. Richard L. Cassin, J&J Joins New Top Ten, FCPA BLOG (Apr. 8, 2011, 4:43 PM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/4/8/jj-joins-new-top-ten.html.
94. See DEMING, supra note 13, at 4 (“[The FCPA’s] provisions have rarely been subject to
judicial scrutiny.”); Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 137, 156 (2010) (“[T]he number of precedents developed under the FCPA
remains quite low despite great legal uncertainty surrounding the law, in large part due to the
use of DPAs [deferred-prosecution agreements] and NPAs [nonprosecution agreements].”); see
also Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred?: Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1869–70
(2005) (discussing the limited judicial role in deferred-prosecution agreements).
95. See, e.g., Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of
Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 441–42 & n.9 (2010)
(explaining the cost of lawsuits to companies and the possibility of lost revenues from damaged
reputations). In addition to these costs, companies found liable under the FCPA may also be
liable under other criminal statutes, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)) that use an FCPA
violation as a predicate offense, Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices
Law, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 129, 134 (2010); see also, e.g., Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 803 F.
Supp. 428, 438 (D.D.C. 1992) (“The Travel Act[, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988 & Supp. III 1992),
is] . . . one of the enumerated predicate acts of racketeering under RICO . . . . Dooley charges
that the British and Saudi defendants committed Travel Act violations because their actions
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. . . . Thus, the success of plaintiff Dooley’s RICOrelated claim that the . . . defendants committed Travel Act violations, hinges on whether these
defendants violated the FCPA.”). Some have argued that this application conflates the meaning
of both statutes. See, e.g., Raymond J. Dowd, Note, Civil RICO Misread: The Judicial Repeal of
the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 946, 947
(1990) (“This Note argues that civil RICO should not provide a remedy for a party claiming
injury due to the commercial bribery of a foreign official.”).
96. See Brooks, supra note 94, at 138 (“[T]he long-term consequences of [deferred or
nonprosecution] agreements perpetuate ambiguities surrounding enforcement of the FCPA.”).
97. DEMING, supra note 13, at 4. In fact, this different interpretation has occurred in at
least one case; the judge acquitted the defendant due to a lack of jurisdiction. Daniel Matzkin,
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court judge described the current state of FCPA enforcement as “a
98
stew of confusion and hypocrisy.”
Finally, the international and domestic focus on anticorruption
has grown dramatically in the past fifteen years. Both developed
countries and emerging economic powers have adopted antibribery
legislation prohibiting payments to foreign officials for the purpose of
99
obtaining business. International financial institutions’ devotion of
resources to anti-money-laundering enforcement efforts in the wake
100
101
of 9/11, coupled with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, have led to
a greater focus on corporate compliance, ethics programs, and
102
accurate recordkeeping. The DOJ and SEC also began to enforce
103
the FCPA more proactively, leading to increases in prosecutions,
104
penalties, and voluntary disclosures. From 2004 to 2009, the number
of FCPA enforcement actions brought by the DOJ and SEC
105
increased eightfold, rising from five to forty. By 2011, fines of more
106
than $20 million were not uncommon as criminal penalties, and
payments in the eight largest settlements have ranged from $137
107
Although self-reporting has risen
million to $800 million.
District Judge Issues Unprecedented Limitation on FCPA’s Jurisdictional Reach,
ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (June 15, 2011), http://www.anticorruptionblog.com/foreign-corruptpractices-act/district-judge-issues-unprecedented-limitation-on-fcpas-jurisdictional-reach (“The
Court rejected the government’s argument for FCPA jurisdiction over Patel . . . founded on
Patel’s mailing a DHL package containing a purchase agreement in furtherance of a corrupt
scheme from the United Kingdom to the United States.”).
98. SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
99. DEMING, supra note 13, at xvii. For example, the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act, 2010,
c. 23, §§ 1–20, passed in April 2010 and effective in July 2011, created a wave of publicity in the
business community, see, e.g., Warin et al., supra note 74, at 7 (discussing how the United
Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office “was gearing up for action” by “increas[ing] the number of
officials assigned to overseas corruption matters” and “adopt[ing] new strategies to combat
international corruption”).
100. Low et al., supra note 37, at 715.
101. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
102. Low et al., supra note 37, at 716.
103. Thomas, supra note 95, at 439–40.
104. Low et al., supra note 37, at 742–43.
105. F. Joseph Warin, John W.F. Chesley & Patrick F. Speice, Jr., Nine Lessons of 2009: The
Year-in-Review of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 38 SEC. REG. L.J. 19, 21 (2010).
106. See Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 779
(2011) (describing fines of $24.8 million for Lockheed Corp. and $26 million for Vetco
International Ltd. in 2007).
107. Cassin, supra note 93. Increased enforcement has created resistance, ranging from a
U.S. Chamber of Commerce legal team striving “to make the case that the law is out of date” to
members of Congress publicly announcing a desire to overhaul the FCPA. Carrie Johnson,
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dramatically due to perceived favorable treatment for voluntary
disclosures of violations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
108
has also taken a more active investigatory role. This atmosphere of
heightened enforcement, coupled with uncertainty about the law’s
scope and its potential foreign relations implications, make the
jurisdictional questions surrounding its application particularly vexing
and relevant.
2. Foreign Parties Within the FCPA’s Scope. Given the three
problems raised by the FCPA’s application to foreign parties, it is
necessary to consider the four ways in which the conduct of foreign
109
parties may become governed by the FCPA. The first is when
foreign companies choose to list stock on American exchanges and
110
become issuers. This jurisdictional hook is uncontroversial, because
111
issuers are subject to the bulk of the federal securities laws. The
second is when a company commits an act in furtherance of a crime in
112
United States territory. This hook is again uncontroversial, because
jurisdiction in criminal law generally rests upon a theory of
territoriality: if an individual commits a criminal act in a certain
113
territory, that territory’s sovereign has jurisdiction. The last two

Businesses Push Back on Foreign Bribery Law, NPR (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/
10/19/141473145/businesses-push-back-on-foreign-bribery-law.
108. McSorley, supra note 106, at 779. There were reportedly at least six ongoing FBI FCPA
investigations in 2011, id. at 779–80, including an undercover FBI sting operation that led to a
highly publicized arrest of twenty-two individuals for FCPA violations, Press Release, Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of Military and Law
Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010), available
at http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2010/wfo011910.htm.
109. This Section uses foreign companies as an example, although it is important to note
that FCPA prosecutions of individuals, including foreign individuals, have also been on the rise.
See, e.g., Roger M. Witten, Kimberly A. Parker, Jay Holtmeier & Lillian H. Potter, The
Increased Prosecution of Individuals Under the FCPA: Trends and Implications, BLOOMBERG L.
REP. RISK & COMPLIANCE, Dec. 2009, at 1, 1–3 (discussing the prosecutions of several
individuals, including two foreign executives of companies subject to the FCPA, under similar
theories as those described in the Introduction, supra).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
111. 79A C.J.S. Securities Regulation § 130 (2011).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
113. See, e.g., State v. Butler, 724 A.2d 657, 660 (Md. 1999) (“Territorial jurisdiction
describes the concept that only when an offense is committed within the boundaries of the
court’s jurisdictional geographic territory . . . may the case be tried in that state.”); People v.
McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (N.Y. 1992) (“Because the State only has power to enact
and enforce criminal laws within its territorial borders, there can be no criminal offense unless it
has territorial jurisdiction.”). This concept of territorial jurisdiction is different from venue,
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methods, those used in JGC’s deferred-prosecution agreement, are
114
One applies expansive vicarious-liability
more controversial.
115
The other interprets the
theories using agency relationships.
territorial provisions of § 78dd-3 as covering acts in furtherance of the
116
bribery that are minor or merely pass through the United States.
Although both vicarious liability under § 78dd-1 and § 78dd-2 and an
extremely broad application of § 78dd-3 are accepted in theory,
difficulties may arise in practice when foreign companies question
117
American enforcement agencies’ jurisdiction over their conduct.
This final jurisdictional theory, using minor or pass-through acts
as the basis for U.S. jurisdiction, can be the most problematic, as the
wire transfer in the JGC case illustrates. In several cases, the DOJ has
put forth the theory that wire transfers through American
correspondent bank accounts—that is, accounts at other banks
maintained to service customers through an interbank relationship—
are sufficient for a territorial act in furtherance of a crime, even if the
money is not knowingly or intentionally routed to the United States
and does not remain in the United States for a significant length of
118
time. Possibly because of the shaky legal foundations on which this

which is the location within the territory at which the trial should be held. Butler, 724 A.2d at
665.
114. See Brown, supra note 92, at 359 (“By failing to link a violation of U.S. law to a
demonstrable prejudice of national interest, the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA exceeds the
legitimate grasp of U.S. legislative and enforcement authorities.”); PHILIP UROFSKY ET AL.,
SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, IT DOESN’T TAKE MUCH: EXPANSIVE JURISDICTION IN FCPA
MATTERS 1 (2009), available at http://www.shearman.com/lt-030409-expansive-jurisdiction-infcpa-matters (noting that such an “expansive jurisdictional claim” “poses both risks and
opportunities for foreign companies as they do business in the global economy”).
115. DEMING, supra note 13, at 59. Vicarious liability for actions taken by an agent subject
to the FCPA is predicated upon knowledge of or a high probability of a violation. Id. at 60–64.
Its imposition stems from both the language of the FCPA and from general accomplice-liability
principles of criminal law. Id. at 59. Vicarious liability also gives the accounting provisions of the
FCPA a very broad scope. Warin et al., supra note 74, at 33.
116. See Warin et al., supra note 74, at 10 (“U.S. regulators have construed relatively minor
acts, such as routing a payment through a U.S. bank account or e-mail traffic to the parent
company in the U.S., as ‘act[s] in furtherance’ sufficient to trigger FCPA jurisdiction.”
(alteration in original)).
117. See supra text accompanying note 9.
118. See Bruce Bean, Beyond All Boundaries: The Extraterritorial Grasp of Anti-Bribery
Legislation, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/beyond-allboundaries-the-extraterritorial-grasp-of-anti-bribery-legislation (“In practice , . . the commerce
clause nexus of the FCPA is met when a dollar wire transfer between two offshore jurisdictions
clears through a New York money center bank, even though there was no ‘intent’ by either of
the parties involved to have any connection with the U.S.”). This theory was also used in the
prosecution of three of Siemens’ wholly foreign subsidiaries. See Complaint at 1, 3, SEC v.
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jurisdictional theory rests, prosecutors have never relied exclusively
119
upon it. Because of its contentiousness, however, the theory has
120
received particular emphasis in practitioner pieces, one of which
described the FCPA’s jurisdiction under § 78dd-3 as “near
121
limitless.” Therefore, the next two Parts of this Note seek to
propose a limit, using traditional methods of statutory interpretation,
such as plain meaning and legislative history, and interpretive canons
of foreign relations law.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
This Part analyzes the FCPA using traditional statutoryinterpretation techniques. It seeks to discover the proper application
of the statute to foreign nonissuers and pays special attention to the
issue of merely tangential territorial connections, such as wire
transfers of bribery funds or the simple act of mailing a package that
will pass through the United States. Therefore, each Section examines
whether the given mechanism of statutory construction clearly
indicates where a dividing line should be placed between conduct that
falls within the FCPA and conduct that does not. Part II.A examines
the plain meaning of the territorial provision of § 78dd-3, and Part
II.B scrutinizes the legislative history of the FCPA and its
amendments. Both lines of analysis ultimately fail to provide a clear
answer regarding the extent of the U.S. jurisdiction under the FCPA,
necessitating the use of substantive canons from foreign relations law
122
in Part III to resolve the ambiguity.

Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-cv-02167-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/2008-12-PK/SEC.pdf (alleging a violation of the
FCPA stemming from “elaborate payment schemes to conceal the nature of . . . corrupt
payments” that ultimately “made use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce”).
119. See UROFSKY ET AL., supra note 114, at 3 (noting that the DOJ and SEC cited
alternative jurisdictional grounds in both SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-cv-02167RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2008), and the Bonny Island Project cases).
120. See, e.g., id. at 1 (noting that the “threat” of expansive jurisdiction “poses both risks
and opportunities for foreign companies as they do business in the global economy”).
121. Mauro M Wolfe, Does the US Government Have Limitless Jurisdiction Enforcing the
FCPA?, 3 NEWSL. CRIM. L. SEC. LEGAL PRAC. DIVISION INT’L B. ASS’N, May 2010, reprinted in
MAURO M WOLFE, DOES THE US GOVERNMENT HAVE LIMITLESS JURISDICTION ENFORCING
THE FCPA? 1 (2010), available at http://www.martindale.com/members/Article_Atachment
.aspx?od=299343&id=1055878&filename=asr-1055918.pdf.
122. Without statutory ambiguity, of course, there is no need to resort to jurisdictionlimiting principles. Cf., e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 88–89 (2001)
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A. The Plain Meaning of the FCPA’s Territorial Provision
The FCPA specifically provides that foreign companies, unlike
issuers or domestic concerns, must commit an act in furtherance of
the bribe within the United States for their conduct to fall within the
statute. Because the text of the statute itself is the root of statutory
123
construction, this Section looks at whether a plain meaning to
§ 78dd-3 can be gleaned from the text alone. The Supreme Court uses
many canons of construction but begins with the plain meaning of the
124
text: and “[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous . . . this
125
first canon is also the last.”
Section 78dd-3, the only prong of the FCPA’s antibribery
provisions that applies directly to foreign nonissuers, reads: “It shall
be unlawful . . . while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or to do any other act in furtherance of” bribing a foreign
126
official. The text contains the phrase “in the territory of the United
States” as a necessary condition of the crime. This inclusion is
particularly significant because § 78dd-3’s sister provisions, § 78dd-1
and § 78dd-2, do not contain a similar clause. In fact, the parallel
provisions relating to issuers and domestic concerns explicitly provide
for extraterritorial application in an “alternative jurisdiction” section
127
that § 78dd-3 lacks. These differences in language suggest a more
limited extraterritorial application of § 78dd-3, but they do not
express the degree of that limitation.
The actual inquiry regarding the scope of § 78dd-3 is not as
simple as the phrase “while in the territory of the United States”
might suggest. Within the confines of the statute, it is not clear what it
means to be “in the territory of the United States” while one is
committing an act in furtherance of the crime or using an

(refusing to apply the plaintiff’s preferred canon of construction when the statute in question
was deemed unambiguous).
123. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979).
124. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (noting that before
turning to other available canons of construction, courts should first apply the “cardinal canon”
that “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says”).
125. Id. at 254.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
127. Compare § 78dd-1(g) (accommodating a theory of “alternative jurisdiction” that allows
extraterritorial jurisdiction), and id. § 78dd-2(i) (same), with id. § 78dd-3 (lacking an alternativejurisdiction section that would provide for extraterritoriality).
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instrumentality of interstate commerce. Conduct by a foreign entity
that occurs primarily in a foreign country raises the particular
difficulty of defining what constitutes such an “act” of bribery taking
place while in the territory of the United States. Does the simple
transfer of money, unintentionally through an American bank
account, fall within those words? Does the act of mailing a package
that will land on U.S. soil qualify? Looking within the confines of the
FCPA alone, there is no definitive answer to these questions.
The next line of inquiry is to deduce the meaning of the phrase
“while in the territory of the United States” by looking at similar
sections of the U.S. Code dealing with extraterritorial jurisdiction or
128
jurisdiction over foreign parties.
For example, anti-moneylaundering laws specify that jurisdiction exists over foreign parties
who violate the law in a “financial transaction that occurs in whole or
129
in part in the United States.” The statute criminalizing transnational
acts of terrorism lays out jurisdiction, alternately, for specified acts
committed “within the United States” and for extraterritorial acts
130
intended to cause substantial harm within the United States. Other
sections of the U.S. Code explicitly provide for jurisdiction over acts
that violate that section but occur abroad by including the phrase,
“[t]here is extraterritorial jurisdiction over [a violation of this
provision],” which obviates any question as to the extent of
131
jurisdiction.

128. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1598 (1991) (“Justice Scalia has urged an abandonment of the Court’s
traditional use of legislative history to interpret statutes. In place of this historical or
intentionalist approach Justice Scalia has argued that, generally speaking, the only legitimate
source for interpretive guidance in statutory cases is the text of the statute at issue, or related
provisions of enacted law which shed light on the meaning of the disputed text.” (emphasis
added)).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(1) (2006) (“Whoever, involving conduct transcending national
boundaries and in a circumstance described [elsewhere in the section] (A) kills, kidnaps, maims,
commits an assault resulting in serious bodily injury, or assaults with a dangerous weapon any
person within the United States; or (B) creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any
other person by destroying or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal
property within the United States or by attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage any
structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United States; in violation
of the laws of any State, or the United States, shall be punished . . . .”).
131. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 351(i) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1039(f) (2006); see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(d) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offense
under certain conditions). These provisions are typically a separate subsection of the statute.
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 351(i). The direct statements regarding extraterritorial application of American
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This survey of territoriality and extraterritoriality in U.S. Code
sections that define criminal offenses adds little insight to the
meaning of § 78dd-3. First, the phrase “while in the territory of the
132
United States” is unique. Because this phrase occurs nowhere else
in thousands of U.S. Code provisions, determining a precise line that
separates “while” one is or is not in the United States for FCPA
purposes is difficult. Second, other U.S. Code provisions that indicate
that an element of a crime must occur within the United States are
often much clearer on exactly what conduct must occur within the
133
United States. This key difference makes it difficult to extrapolate
an interpretation from another provision of the U.S. Code to the
FCPA. The fact that Congress has used significantly clearer
provisions when defining territoriality and when providing for
extraterritoriality helps to highlight the ambiguity of the territoriality
provision of the FCPA. Although a strict textualist would end the
134
inquiry with the text, others would turn to legislative history to
interpret congressional intent to add meaning to the text. This Note
next turns to the legislative history of the FCPA and its amendments
to determine what must occur within the United States for conduct to
fall within the ambit of § 78dd-3.
B. Legislative Intent Behind the Enactment of the Territorial
Provision
This Section examines legislative history to determine
congressional intent as to the scope of the FCPA’s application to
foreign parties. When enacting the statute in 1977, Congress was
faced with more than three hundred known instances of American

law stem from the Supreme Court’s clear-statement rules about extraterritoriality. See infra
note 173 and accompanying text.
132. This figure came from an exact-phrase search of the “USCA” database within Westlaw.
133. See supra notes 129–131 and accompanying text. For example, the money-laundering
statute states that the territorial aspect involves a financial transaction, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006 &
Supp. IV 2011), as amended by Border Tunnel Prevention Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-127, 126
Stat. 371, and the terrorism statute lays out four crimes that may trigger the statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332b(a).
134. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Bandy, Note, Interpretive Freedom: A Necessary Component of
Article III Judging, 61 DUKE L.J. 651, 655 (2011) (“[Justice Scalia] is particularly averse to the
use of legislative history, not only because he believes it is an unreliable measure of
congressional intent, but also because he fundamentally rejects the entire project of seeking
legislative intent. To Justice Scalia, only the words of a statute have gone through the legislative
process, and thus only the words are law.” (citations omitted)).
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135

companies bribing foreign officials and with American companies
136
creating “slush funds” for illicit payments overseas. The original
House and Senate reports do not reference any instances of foreign
137
bribery by foreign corporations. Additionally, around the same time
that Congress deliberately created a narrow jurisdictional basis when
138
enacting the FCPA, it amended the Export Administration Act of
139
140
1969 to “intentionally grant[] broad extraterritorial authority.”
This is only a partial picture, however, because the relevant
provisions creating extraterritorial jurisdiction for issuers and
domestic concerns, as well as the entirety of § 78dd-3, were not added
141
to the FCPA until 1998. It is thus the legislative history of the
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act, the statute that
amended the FCPA to add those provisions, that is most relevant.
The legislative history of the 1998 amendments does give some
indication that Congress interpreted the phrase “while in the territory
of the United States” rather literally. The House report that
accompanied the legislation stated that the act in furtherance of the
142
crime must be “taken within the territory of the United States.” The
use of “taken within” instead of “while” strongly implies a deliberate
action by the perpetrators in the United States rather than a simple
electronic transfer that passes through the United States. Elsewhere,
the report states:
Although this section limits jurisdiction over foreign nationals
and companies to instances in which the foreign national or
company takes some action while physically present within the
territory of the United States, Congress does not thereby intend to

135. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101.
136. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105srpt277/pdf/CRPT-105srpt277.pdf.
137. S. REP. NO. 95-114; H.R. REP. NO. 95-831 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121; H.R. REP. NO. 95-640 (1977).
138. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. III, 91 Stat. 1629, replaced by Export
Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2401–2420 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
139. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841, replaced by Export
Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2401–2420).
140. Small, supra note 25, at 285.
141. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006)).
142. H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 21 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT105hrpt802/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt802.pdf.
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place a similar limit on the exercise of U.S. criminal jurisdiction over
foreign nationals and companies under any other statute or
143
regulation.

This quotation offers a compelling indication that, to Congress,
the phrase “while in the territory of the United States” from § 78dd-3
indicates a tangible physical presence, such as that of a person, rather
than the fleeting electronic presence of an asset in a bank account.
The House and Senate reports also contain somewhat contradictory
statements about the degree of territoriality necessary to trigger
144
§ 78dd-3, including the phrase, “an extensive physical connection to
145
the bribery act is not required.” Therefore, although there are some
indications that Congress intended the territorial provision of § 78dd3 to be taken literally, the presence of conflicting interpretations
within the legislative history requires more than a cursory
examination and compels consideration of the context of these
seemingly conflicting sections.
When passing the 1998 amendments to the FCPA, Congress was
concerned with “achieving a level playing field” so that American
companies prohibited from paying bribes were not at a disadvantage
146
on the world marketplace. Congress’s method for realizing this
purpose was to “[a]chiev[e] comparable prohibitions in other
developed countries” by cooperating with international governments
rather than unilaterally policing foreign nations’ illicit payments to
147
other foreign nations’ officials. The OECD Convention was the end
148
result. Congress considered the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act, including the added § 78dd-3 providing liability for
territorial acts of foreign parties, to be implementing legislation for
149
the OECD Convention. Thus, because all of the 1998 changes
incorporate treaty provisions, the FCPA as currently written must be

143. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
144. The legislative history indicates both that territoriality “should be interpreted broadly”
and that jurisdiction is “limit[ed] . . . to instances in which the foreign national or company takes
some action while physically present within the territory of the United States.” S. REP. NO. 105277, at 6 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105srpt277/pdf/CRPT105srpt277.pdf.
145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 10.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
149. H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 11 (“This legislation amends the FCPA to conform it to the
requirements of and to implement the OECD Convention.”).
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considered in light of the OECD Convention according to norms for
150
implementing legislation.
III. CANONS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Part III applies canons of foreign relations law to elucidate the
proper boundaries of the FCPA’s application to foreign entities. Part
III.A examines theories of territoriality and extraterritoriality, by first
broadly examining the concept of extraterritoriality in international
law and in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States. Part III.A also examines the jurisprudence of the
territorial-effects test and applies recent case law to the FCPA. Part
III.B examines possible criticisms of the presumption against
territoriality as applied to the FCPA and defends the application of
the presumption, and Part III.C explains why two alternative canons
are inapplicable to the present law.
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
1. An Introduction to Territoriality and Extraterritoriality.
Problems associated with one nation applying its laws to foreign
151
nationals occur frequently in an increasingly globalized world.
150. Part III.A.1, infra, discusses this principle in detail and applies the interpretive
techniques that have developed around treaty-implementing legislation to the FCPA.
151. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 63, at 325 (“Many of the most difficult and
controversial international legal disputes arise when states seek to assert authority over persons,
property, or events abroad. These disputes often involve the extraterritorial application of
domestic law in ways that harm the interests of other states and at times are contrary to
international legal limits on the exercise of jurisdiction.”). Perhaps the most famous example of
the exertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the prosecution of Nazi war criminal Adolph
Eichmann in Israel under a universal-jurisdiction theory. MITSUE INAZUMI, UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (2005). The significant foreign-relations
and policy implications of sweeping extraterritorial jurisdiction have been widely discussed. See,
e.g., John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 379
(2010) (“Avoiding inadvertent international conflicts is an important reason to limit the reach of
U.S. statutes, as the Supreme Court has recognized since its earliest cases.”); Austen Parrish,
The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1478 (2008)
(“Academics and courts have unwisely underestimated the problems created by the effects test,
and with it the problems associated with countries applying their law beyond their borders.”);
Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, supra note 82, at 1286 (“It is thus not a surprise
that ‘host country resentment’ and ‘transnational tension and strife’ result when, under the
FCPA, the United States ‘monitor[s] and seek[s] to control sensitive affairs host countries would
prefer to govern themselves.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Salbu, supra
note 91, at 133; and Daniel Patrick Ashe, Comment, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the
United States: The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2897, 2928 (2005))).
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Today, countries frequently seek to regulate, and therefore assert
jurisdiction over, extraterritorial acts that have effects within the
152
country exercising jurisdiction. Therefore, this Section more closely
examines domestic and international law on extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
There are three types of jurisdiction: jurisdiction to prescribe,
153
jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce.
Under
international law, a nation has the power to prescribe conduct under
five principles: (1) territorial jurisdiction or territorial effects;
(2) nationality; (3) passive-personality jurisdiction; (4) protective
154
jurisdiction; and (5) universal jurisdiction. The last principle,
universal jurisdiction, only pertains to egregious or heinous crimes; it
was first invoked during the Holocaust war crimes tribunals in the
155
wake of World War II. Nationality jurisdiction, as its name implies,
156
rests upon residence or citizenship. Passive-personality jurisdiction
and protective jurisdiction apply to conduct that occurs outside of a
nation’s territory but that harms or threatens a state’s nationals
(passive-personality) or a state’s existence or core functions
157
(protective).
The remaining basis of jurisdiction to prescribe conduct—
territorial jurisdiction—supports, potentially controversially, the
FCPA’s asserted jurisdiction over parties under § 78dd-3. This basis
of jurisdiction has also spawned a complicated American
jurisprudence in an attempt to define a territorial effect sufficient to
bring foreign conduct under the purview of American law, which is
158
presumed to have only territorial application. Section 402(1) of the
Restatement (Third) defines territorial jurisdiction in the following
manner:

152. One common example is antitrust, or competition, law. Small, supra note 25, at 283.
153. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 63, at 325–26.
154. Id. at 332, 346–49.
155. Id. at 349. See generally INAZUMI, supra note 151 (examining the concept of universal
jurisdiction in modern international law, with a special focus on its impact on human rights).
156. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 63, at 346.
157. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (1987) (“[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . (2) the
activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.”).
158. William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. REV. 687, 687 (2011).
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[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within
its territory; (b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present
within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is
159
intended to have substantial effect within its territory.

The Restatement (Third) also places certain limits on the
exercise of jurisdiction, even when one of its aforementioned bases is
present, through a multifactor balancing test for reasonability that
examines the regulating state’s link to the activity being regulated, the
connections between the person responsible and the regulating state,
the character and importance of the activity being regulated, the
importance and compatibility of regulation to the international
system, and the interest of and likelihood of conflict with another
160
state in regulating the activity. Thus, the Restatement (Third) gives
some guidance, though no definite rules, on the exercise of
jurisdiction against a foreign company, such as JGC, for an act that
occurs in a foreign country but that has at least some territorial nexus
to the regulating country. The next Subsection, therefore, turns to
specific Supreme Court precedent on extraterritoriality and territorial
effects.
2. Territorial Effects and Extraterritoriality in American Law.
There is a strong presumption that American laws, including the
FCPA, do not apply abroad if there is no clear indication of
161
congressional intent to do so. The Supreme Court has long resisted
applying American laws to noncitizens for actions taken outside of
the United States despite Congress’s constitutional authority to

159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402. The Restatement (Third) is considered to be quite authoritative in this field and is cited
by the Supreme Court in foreign-relations cases. E.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2285
n.6, 2290 n.15 (2010); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346, 377, 381 (2006).
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403.
161. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (“When a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”); EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“We assume that Congress legislates against the
backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.”), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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162

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
legislate extraterritorially.
surrounding territoriality and the territorial-effects test has wavered
between a balancing test similar to that advocated by the
Restatement (Third) and more categorical modes of analysis, but the
core hesitance to apply American law to noncitizens and
163
nonterritorial conduct has remained. This reluctance is particularly

162. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Though it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally presumed not to
have exceeded those customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe.”).
163. This footnote provides a brief analysis of the history of extraterritoriality in American
jurisprudence to demonstrate the resilience of the presumption against extraterritoriality
throughout the past century and to introduce the key cases and concepts that are discussed
throughout Part III.A.2.
Until the second half of the twentieth century, the United States followed a strict
territoriality rule; courts applied only domestic legislation to acts that occurred within the
country. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“But the
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined by the law of the country where it is done.”), overruled by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
Following World War II, the Second Circuit, sitting on a special panel as the nation’s highest
court, extended the reach of the territorial principle by replacing strict territoriality with a test
examining the foreign conduct’s effect in the forum state, creating a broader jurisdictional
reach. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945)
(“[I]t is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities . . . for conduct outside its borders
that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.”). Increasing globalization
had rendered strict territoriality too restrictive to meet American needs abroad. DUNOFF ET
AL., supra note 63, at 333. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), became well established in courts
as the territorial-effects doctrine, which holds actors liable for extraterritorial actions if three
conditions are met: (1) Congress intends extraterritorial application; (2) defendants intend their
actions to produce effects within the United States; and (3) defendants’ actions do produce
substantial effects within the United States, see, e.g., Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 887
(5th Cir. 1967) (applying the territorial-effects doctrine). Because lower courts had varying
interpretations of what establishes substantial effects within the United States, the Ninth Circuit
attempted to clarify this standard in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A.,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), superseded by Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006)), by creating a
balancing test to weigh domestic and international interests in a manner similar to that which
was later articulated in the Restatement, see supra notes 159–160 and accompanying text.
The next major Supreme Court decision in this area significantly swung the pendulum
of extraterritorial jurisdiction back toward a more categorical presumption against
extraterritorial application of American law. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 250–56. The Court, however,
outlined a different test in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, asking
whether a “true conflict” between compliance with U.S. law and foreign law exists, id. at 798.
Although this test appears to be a departure from prior jurisprudence, it still reiterates the key
presumptions that American laws are territorial in nature and should not be interpreted in a
way that violates international law. Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A
New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 140 (2010). The
latest case in this line, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010),
applies the presumption against extraterritoriality with renewed vigor, see id. at 2877 (“When a
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”). The Supreme
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164

relevant in criminal law. As the Supreme Court clarified in
165
Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
this presumption is
particularly strong when the intended effects of the illegal action are
166
felt outside of the United States.
Morrison examined, and rejected, a claim for extraterritorial
167
application of another section of the 1934 Act, section 10(b). The
events that led to the suit began when an Australian bank whose
stock was not traded on U.S. exchanges purchased a Florida
168
mortgage-servicing company. After the bank wrote down over $2
billion of the mortgage company’s value, Australians who purchased
the bank’s shares before the write-down brought suit in U.S. District
Court in New York, alleging that figures from the mortgage
company’s valuation models that had been represented in the bank’s
annual reports constituted manipulative and deceptive practices
169
under section 10(b) and its accompanying regulations. In rejecting
the shareholders’ claims, the Court created a more definite rule to
prevent the judiciary from guessing Congress’s intention in each piece
of legislation with possible extraterritorial application; after
Morrison,
courts
simply
apply
a
presumption
against
170
extraterritoriality across the board.
If Congress desires the
application of a law to conduct abroad, it must specifically state that

Court’s stance in Morrison is much more direct than Hartford Fire’s “true conflicts” test or the
balancing tests of Timberlane and the Restatement (Third). Morrison, therefore, holds the key
to analyzing the FCPA’s application abroad.
164. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436–39 (1932) (holding that a citizen of
the United States can be held criminally liable for violations of American laws committed
abroad, but that unless Congress makes clear an intent for the law to apply extraterritorially, a
criminal statute only applies within the United States); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 610, 620, 641–42 (1818) (holding that criminal piracy committed by a foreigner can only
be tried by the courts of the United States if the piracy is a violation of the law of nations
because “congress cannot make that piracy which is not piracy by the law of nations, in order to
give jurisdiction to its own courts over such offences”).
165. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
166. Id. at 2883–85.
167. Id. at 2875; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)
(“It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance . . . . ”). The suit in Morrison
was brought as a private right of action. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876. FCPA cases, by contrast,
are brought as enforcement actions by the government.
168. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875.
169. Id. at 2875–76.
170. Id. at 2881.
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171

in the text. Justice Scalia justified the presumption as the only way
to avoid “[t]he results of judicial-speculation-made-law—divining
what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation
172
before the court.”
The FCPA’s regulation of foreign companies, somewhat
surprisingly due to its international character, fits remarkably well
into Morrison’s framework for the application of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. First, the presumption against
extraterritoriality is very strong and can only be rebutted by a clear
173
indication of congressional intent for extraterritorial application. As
shown in Part II.B, the FCPA’s legislative history indicates, if
anything, that Congress was reluctant to prescribe conduct for foreign
entities without a meaningful connection to the United States, rather
than eager for the broad applicability underlying current enforcement
174
practices.
Second, and most critically, the presumption against
extraterritoriality even applies to cases when there are some domestic
175
connections. There will usually be some aspect of territoriality in
any FCPA case that attracts DOJ enforcement, but a limited
territorial connection—such as a wire transfer in which funds pass
through the United States or an e-mail sent to the United States—
should not be not sufficient to disturb the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Morrison itself proves that the presumption applies
even in cases with a significant connection to the United States. In
that case, a company allegedly fraudulently manipulated its financial
176
models and made “misleading public statements” in Florida.
Because “the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where
the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in
the United States,” and the securities in question in Morrison were
171. See id. at 2881 n.5 (“But when it comes to ‘the scope of [prohibited conduct], the text of
the statute controls our decision.’” (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994))).
172. Id. at 2881.
173. See id. at 2878 (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none.”). For examples of such a clear indication, see supra note 131 and
accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 135–143 and accompanying text.
175. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (“For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial
application that lacks all contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its
kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.”).
176. Id. at 2883–84.

ROSS IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/19/2012 9:40 AM

EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE FCPA

475

only being traded abroad, the Court held that the United States
177
should decline jurisdiction. Although the FCPA is not exactly
analogous to the 1934 Act, the same “focus analysis” can be applied
to FCPA cases—the focus of the FCPA is the place of the origin of
178
the bribery and the place of the act entailing the crime. Territorial
liability should not be premised upon a mere pass-through or
tangential connection.
Third, the presumption against extraterritoriality is a statutory
canon of construction designed to deal with ambiguity in a U.S.
179
statute. The division between extraterritoriality and territoriality in
§ 78dd-3 is deeply ambiguous. As Parts II and III.A have shown,
there are two plausible constructions of this provision: one which
offers a near-limitless application to foreign nonissuers’ actions
abroad or another which offers a constrained application that gives
meaning to the territorial clause of § 78dd-3. Without the
presumption, courts would be forced to choose one of these two
viable alternatives when examining whether any given conduct with a
minimal territorial connection meets the “while in the territory of the
United
States”
requirement.
The
presumption
against
extraterritoriality, however, makes the choice for the court: the canon
adds “persuasi[on]” to what was formerly merely one of several
180
“plausible” constructions.
Fourth, the presumption against extraterritoriality applies
“regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the
181
American statute and a foreign law.” This is particularly important
in the case of the FCPA, which occupies a field in which there is
182
significant foreign legislation and several international treaties. If

177. Id. at 2884.
178. The FCPA prohibits particular acts that issuers and their agents may take to obtain
business. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006) (defining the actus reus of the crime as “mak[ing] use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an
offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift,
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value”); id. § 78dd-2 (same); id.
§ 78dd-3 (same); see also supra Part I.A.
179. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S. Code).
180. See id. (“We need not choose between these competing interpretations as we would be
required to do in the absence of the presumption against extraterritorial application . . . . Each is
plausible, but no more persuasive than that.”).
181. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–78.
182. See supra Part I.A.3.
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international norms on the subject mandated extraterritorial
application to the broadest extent possible, courts could still apply
this presumption instead of relying on other canons of foreign
183
relations law, such as those considered in Part III.C. This aspect of
the presumption against extraterritoriality is important in its
application to the FCPA because it provides a simplicity that analysis
184
of foreign relations law often lacks.
Finally, this approach has two additional benefits. First, it avoids
a construction of the statute that could have negative foreign-policy
effects because the presumption against extraterritoriality discourages
courts from extending American jurisdiction beyond the outer limits
185
of what is internationally acceptable. This is a logical result because
avoiding conflict with other nations motivates the presumption
186
against extraterritoriality in the first place. A powerful presumption
against extraterritoriality also obviates certain separation-of-powers
concerns that accompany the nonpolitical branch’s involvement in an
187
issue wrought with policy decisions, like international corruption.
Because there is a clear rule, the judiciary’s decisions do not appear
to be made on an ad hoc or inconsistent basis. The second benefit is
that this approach is in line with recent precedent from the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. In 2012, Judge
Richard Leon acquitted a defendant charged with an FCPA violation
188
for want of jurisdiction. Judge Leon rejected the DOJ’s argument
that a United Kingdom citizen who mailed a package from London to
the United States committed an act that established jurisdiction under
189
§ 78dd-3.
183. Some scholars would disagree with this statement, but others would embrace the
courts’ narrow construction of international law without clear congressional intent to apply it
domestically. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., supra Part II and note 163.
185. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (justifying strict
territoriality on the grounds that it forestalls conflict with a foreign sovereign), overruled by
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
187. For an analysis of separation-of-powers concerns in foreign-relations issues, see
generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
188. United States v. Goncalves, No. 09-335 (D.D.C. 2012) (granting motion to dismiss).
189. See FCPA Summer Review 2011, MILLER CHEVALIER (July 13, 2011), http://
www.millerchevalier.com/Publications/MillerChevalierPublications?find=60408 (“I would think
the more cautious, conservative interpretation would be that each act has to be while in the
territory of the United States.” (quoting Judge Leon) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Indictment at 5, United States v. Goncalves, No. 1:09-cr-00335-RJL4 (D.D.C. Apr. 16,
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B. Rebutting the Critics
Critics may argue that the international nature of the FCPA
negates the presumption against extraterritoriality; after all, other
parts of the FCPA contain an alternative-jurisdiction provision
specifically providing for extraterritoriality. This argument, however,
actually strengthens the presumption’s applicability to § 78dd-3,
which provides for application only “while in the territory of the
United States.” The absence of an alternative-jurisdiction provision
coupled with the territorial phrase in § 78dd-3 creates a sharp contrast
with the other two of the FCPA’s antibribery provisions. Therefore,
190
courts should give meaning to Congress’s clear omission. In
Morrison, the Court used a similar line of analysis, juxtaposing
section 10(b) against section 30(b) of the 1934 Act, a similar provision
that, unlike section 10(b), does explicitly provide for extraterritorial
191
application.
Similarly, although the Court justified the presumption against
extraterritoriality by reasoning that Congress’s primary concern is the
192
domestic sphere, this statement does not refute the presumption
against extraterritoriality with regard to the inherently international
FCPA. First, the presumption that Congress is focused on domestic
effects is merely a presumption; it is not a mandatory statement of the
only circumstances in which this canon may apply. The text of
§ 78dd-3 overcomes an argument that the FCPA is out of the reach of
the presumption against extraterritoriality by its explicit statement of
territorial effect. A second, alternative counterargument focuses on
the legislative history. Congress passed the original FCPA to regulate
American entities; subsequent amendments were passed to benefit
American companies, who argued that they were disadvantaged by
193
the regulations. Even though the FCPA deals with an international
2010) (“[Pankesh Patel] was a citizen of the United Kingdom and, as such, was a ‘person’ other
than an issuer or a domestic concern as that term was defined in the FCPA.” (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-3(f)(1) (2006))); id. at 24–25 (alleging that, in violation of the FCPA, Patel mailed a
package to the United States in connection with the bribery).
190. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997) (discussing and applying the canon
of construction of “negative implications raised by disparate provisions”).
191. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882–83; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 30(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2006) (“The[se] provisions . . . shall not apply to any person insofar as he
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts
such business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.”).
192. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
193. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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problem, it is solidly rooted in the domestic arena, over which
Congress is presumed to legislate.
194
Other critics may cite Pasquantino v. United States, a 2005
Supreme Court case holding that Canadian defendants violated 18
U.S.C. § 1343, the wire-fraud statute, by making simple phone orders
from American liquor stores and developing a subsequent plan to
195
smuggle the liquor into Canada to avoid paying Canadian taxes.
Despite the lack of territorial connection other than the phone call,
the Court found the defendants liable because the statute criminalizes
the “scheme” itself, so the criminal act was completed as soon as
196
defendants used the telephone to set it up. In Morrison, however,
the Supreme Court distinguished Pasquantino because Pasquantino
dealt with the wire-fraud statute, which, unlike section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, was “without any requirement that it be ‘in connection
197
with’ any particular transaction or event.” The same analysis
distinguishes a violation under the wire-fraud statute that was at issue
in Pasquantino from an FCPA violation under § 78dd-3, which is
predicated on an act occurring “while in the territory of the United
States.”
C. Foreign-Relations Alternatives to the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality
Because the presumption against extraterritoriality is merely one
of several canons of construction used in foreign relations law, this
Section examines possible alternatives to the limiting theory posited
in the previous Section. It begins with the borrowed-treaty rule and
follows with an examination of the Charming Betsy canon. Both
subsections first describe the relevant interpretive technique and then
apply that method to the FCPA’s provisions on territoriality.
1. The 1998 Amendments as Implementing Legislation. Foreignrelations-law scholars explore the interplay between statutory
interpretation and treaty text, and one scholar has recently developed
194. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005).
195. Id. at 353–55.
196. Id. at 371.
197. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887 (“Section 10(b) by contrast, punishes not all acts of
deception, but only such acts ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.’ Not deception alone, but
deception with respect to certain purchases or sales is necessary for a violation of the statute.”
(quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b))).
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an interpretive framework for legislation that, like the FCPA’s 1998
198
The so-called
amendments, incorporates treaty provisions.
“borrowed treaty rule” suggests that “the court’s interpretation of an
incorporative statute should always be consistent with its
interpretation of the source treaty text unless there is compelling
evidence that Congress, in enacting the statute, intended to deviate
199
from the rule set forth in the treaty.” Though the term “borrowed
treaty rule” is a scholarly creation, the Supreme Court has frequently
200
used this interpretive technique.
Although the 1998 FCPA
amendments—as implementing legislation of the OECD
Convention—seemingly fit well within this foreign-relations-law
mechanism, examining the OECD Convention yields no more
information than this Note’s prior examination of the legislative
history of the FCPA amendments on the scope of the FCPA’s
exterterritorial application.
The FCPA and the OECD Convention fit well into the
framework of the borrowed-treaty rule for three reasons. First, the
legislative history indicates on multiple occasions that the FCPA
amendments are implementing legislation for the OECD
201
Convention. Second, the 1998 amendments directly mirror the text
202
of the treaty, which had in turn used the FCPA as a template. Third,
the legislative history from 1998 pulls understandings directly from
the official commentaries to the OECD Convention that explain the

198. See John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L
L. 655, 663 (2010) (“The goal of this Article is to develop a framework that provides a more
robust and comprehensive understanding of those statutes that incorporate language and
concepts derived from treaties to which the United States is a party.”).
199. Id. at 669–70 (emphasis omitted).
200. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534–37
(1995) (interpreting section 3(8) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300–
1315 (1994), in line with the Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to Bills of Lading (Hague Rules), Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, on which the American statute
was modeled); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–41 (1987) (construing the term “wellfounded fear” in the statutory definition of a refugee in accordance with Article 1(2) of the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267, to which the United States was a signatory). But see INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 427–28 (1984) (finding no ambiguity in a questioned term in section 243(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976), and thus refusing to turn to
a relevant treaty on the subject).
201. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1, 2, 3–6 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-105srpt277/pdf/CRPT-105srpt277.pdf.
202. See supra Part I.A.3.
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meaning of certain OECD Convention provisions. Given the
strength of the connection between the 1998 amendments and the
OECD Convention, it is logical to use the OECD Convention to
interpret the amendments’ ambiguities. Furthermore, the context of
the jurisdictional amendments suggests that they fall within the
204
borrowed-treaty framework.
Although on a theoretical level the OECD Convention should
shed light on the DOJ’s prosecution of foreign companies for foreign
bribery, it actually does not add relevant information to the domestic
legislative history. Article 4(1)’s territorial standard—that signatories
must criminalize offenses “committed in whole or in part in its
205
territory” —provides no more guidance than the ambiguous
provision in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. It is silent on the borderline cases,
such as that of JGC, that involve a simple transfer of funds or
electronic messages through a particular territory.
The OECD Convention’s Commentaries provide some
clarification: “The territorial basis for jurisdiction should be
interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the
206
bribery act is not required.” This explanation again does not add
insight beyond the contradictory legislative history of the FCPA,
which provides an identical statement: “Congress intends that the
‘territorial basis for jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly so that

203. H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 22 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT105hrpt802/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt802.pdf (“As envisioned in the OECD the territorial basis for
jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the
bribery act is not required.” (citing Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 31, cmt. para. 25, 37 I.L.M. at 10)).
204. Congress thought of the jurisdictional changes to the FCPA as implementing the
OECD Convention Article 4(4) requirement that a signatory “shall review whether its current
basis for jurisdiction is effective in the fight against the bribery of foreign public officials and, if
it is not, shall take remedial steps.” Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 31, art. 4(4), 37 I.L.M. at 5.
Specifically, Article 4(1) mandates that a signatory “take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is
committed in whole or in part in its territory,” id. art. 4(1), 37 I.L.M. at 5, which formed the
basis for the addition of 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3, see supra text accompanying note 85. Article 4(2),
the impetus for the addition of the alternative-jurisdiction provisions that apply to issuers and
domestic concerns, requires that a signatory nation takes adequate steps to “prosecute its
nationals for offences committed abroad” if the nation’s laws allow for extraterritorial
jurisdiction based on the nationality principle. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 31, art. 4(2), 37 I.L.M. at 5.
205. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, supra note 31, art. 4(1), 37 I.L.M. at 5.
206. Id. cmt. para. 25, 37 I.L.M. at 10.
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an extensive physical connection to the bribery act is not required.’”
The OECD Convention has no official drafting history to provide
208
additional guidance on the extent of the territorial connection.
Thus, this alternative foreign-relations-law technique falls short of
offering limiting principles that are provided by the presumption
against extraterritoriality.
2. The Charming Betsy Canon. From the earliest days of the
nation, the Supreme Court has chosen to interpret American law with
the presumption that Congress does not intend to violate
209
international norms. This presumption, dubbed the Charming Betsy
canon, “became the bedrock for a series of later decisions involving
210
international law and judicial construction” and continues to be
211
influential. One of its traditional uses has been to avoid potential
conflicts between statutes and customary international law, often in
212
questions of extraterritorial effects. The Charming Betsy canon “is
relevant to determining the substantive reach of a statute because ‘the
law of nations’ . . . includes limitations on a nation’s exercise of its
213
jurisdiction to prescribe.” The canon emerged to safeguard against
the possible effect of judicial decisions on American foreign policy
207. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 6 (1998) (quoting Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 31, cmt. para. 25, 37 I.L.M. at
10), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105srpt277/pdf/CRPT-105srpt277.pdf.
208. OECD, OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION: OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 1 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyin
internationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/46510795.pdf.
209. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to
affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this
country.”); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801) (“[W]e think with great force, that
the laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to infract the
common principles and usages of nations, or the general doctrines of national law.”).
210. Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 213 (1993).
211. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (“[T]his
Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the
sovereign authority of other Nations. . . . This rule of construction reflects principles of
customary international law—law that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily seeks to follow.”);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[S]tatutes should
not be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or conduct if that regulation would conflict with
principles of international law.”).
212. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 489 (1998).
213. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 815.
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due to the sensitive nature of international relations. Although
scholars have argued against its broad use to incorporate
215
international norms into American law through the judiciary, it
216
remains an important interpretive tool in U.S. law.
Often, the Charming Betsy canon is used to invoke the norms of
217
customary international law. International norms against public
corruption, however, have not yet reached the level of jus cogens or
customary international law, so treaties form the basis of the
218
international law analysis. Because the OECD Convention is one of
the primary treaties against which norms of antibribery laws’ scope
can be determined, this Subsection looks first to that document. The

214. See Coyle, supra note 198, at 701 (“Although the [Charming Betsy] Court is not explicit
on this point, it appears from the decision that the importance of avoiding a conflict between the
statute and those rights possessed by neutral parties under international law informed the
Court’s decision to adopt two specific constructions of the Non-Intercourse Act[, Act of Feb. 27,
1800, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 7].”).
215. See id. at 708–09 (“Professor Bradley [argues that] an expansive reading of the
Charming Betsy canon is undemocratic in that it amounts to ‘a mandate for court-supervised
incorporation of international law’ and that the canon ‘simply allows courts to avoid unintended
clashes with international law,’ leaving ‘the ultimate questions of incorporation and
international law compliance to the U.S. political branches.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Curtis
A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 529, 546–47 (1999))). Instead of taking an internationalist view, Professor Bradley justifies
the canon from a separation-of-powers perspective. See Bradley, supra note 212, at 525 (“[T]he
separation of powers conception views the Charming Betsy canon as a means of both respecting
the formal constitutional roles of Congress and the President and preserving a proper balance
and harmonious working relationship among the three branches of the federal government.”).
216. Because there is a debate about the extent to which courts employing the Charming
Betsy canon should seek out international norms to incorporate them into domestic law, this
Note takes a narrow approach and only examines jurisdictional provisions of the leading
antibribery treaties.
217. See Bradley, supra note 212, at 488–90 (noting that the Charming Betsy canon has been
used to avoid possible conflicts with treaties as well as “to avoid constructions of statutes that
would violate customary international law”).
218. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 325 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Without
an analysis of the laws enacted by the various signatories, it is impossible to draw any
conclusions regarding the practice of states with regard to the issue of the degree of corporate
liability for violation of international law norms. Indeed, as Professor Bassiouni has observed,
although ‘contemporary international efforts to deal with organized crime, corruption, and drug
trafficking’ are moving in the direction of corporate liability ‘these new concepts of corporate
criminal responsibility have not yet found their way into [customary international law].’”
(footnote omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 377 (2d rev. ed. 1999))), aff’d for lack of
quorum sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008); Evan J. Criddle &
Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 333 (2009)
(noting that although corruption is frowned upon, a norm against corruption is not recognized
as jus cogens).
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OECD Convention’s Commentaries contain broad notions of
territorial application. That is, “an extensive physical connection to
219
The OECD Convention’s
the bribery act is not required.”
recommendations, however, also contain the significant caveat that a
signatory should act “in conformity with its jurisdictional and other
220
basic legal principles.” Given its acquiescence to domestic law, the
OECD Convention appears to establish neither limitations to a broad
construction of the FCPA’s territorial section nor positive obligations
to apply a limited territorial nexus to the questioned provision.
The other key treaty establishing international norms on
anticorruption enforcement is the 2003 United Nations Convention
221
Against Corruption,
hailed as “the most widely accepted
222
international anti-bribery agreement.” This treaty has a specific
article devoted to the “Protection of Sovereignty,” which explicitly
states that “[p]arties shall carry out their obligations under this
Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign
equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention
223
in the domestic affairs of other States.” Although this article
“refuses to endorse the kind of extraterritorial prosecutions of foreign
224
bribery pursued by the United States,” it also provides for broad
225
signatory autonomy on issues of jurisdiction in Article 42(6).

219. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, supra note 31, cmt. para. 25, 37 I.L.M. at 10.
220. Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Pub. Officials in Int’l Bus.
Transactions, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 3, in OECD, CONVENTION ON
COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 20, 21 (2011).
221. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature Dec. 9, 2003, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 109-6 (2005), 2349 U.N.T.S. 41. Several regional organizations also have
localized anticorruption conventions. E.g., African Union, Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption, opened for signature July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 (2005); Council of
Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, done Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173;
Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, done Mar.
29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996).
222. Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, supra note 82, at 1286.
223. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 221, art. 4(1), S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 109-6 at 26, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 147.
224. Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, supra note 82, at 1286.
225. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 221, art. 42(6), S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 109-6 at 43, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 164 (“Without prejudice to norms of general
international law, this Convention shall not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction
established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law.”).
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Therefore, it is not evident that adoption of expansive jurisdictional
reach would explicitly violate the OECD Convention.
The undefined scope of the phrase “in the territory” contained in
the various conventions coupled with their general deference to
domestic law preclude the use of the Charming Betsy canon to
226
determining the scope of the FCPA’s extraterritorial application. It
only applies when an ambiguous U.S. statute, such as 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-3, can be interpreted as either conforming with or deviating
from established international law. Here, the international norms
contain the same ambiguity as the FCPA itself. Thus, much like the
possibility of interpreting the FCPA in light of the OECD
Convention, the Charming Betsy canon does not provide any
information beyond the traditional interpretive techniques discussed
in Part II. Therefore, the presumption against extraterritoriality
appears to be the best limiting principle to curb the current
application of the FCPA to foreign parties for foreign actions.
CONCLUSION
FCPA enforcement actions have expanded in number, size, and
scope, and prosecutorial decisions have directed enforcement actions
at an expanded range of violators, including foreign individuals and
foreign companies that do not issue stock on American exchanges.
These developments have led to many cases, such as the prosecution
of JGC, which illustrate the same phenomenon: expansive
jurisdictional theories that push the statute’s text and history to its
outermost limits. Because deferred-prosecution agreements are so
prevalent, courts have not ruled on the propriety—or legality—of the
DOJ’s expansive theories of jurisdiction arising from vicarious
liability and merely tangential territorial connections. Therefore, this
Note tests these broad prosecutorial theories against a range of
interpretive techniques.
In the end, the strengthened, post-Morrison presumption against
extraterritoriality defines the ambiguity in the FCPA’s text regarding

226. A broader application of the Charming Betsy canon to incorporate customary
international law could be used to advocate a more limited jurisdictional theory in relation to
territorial acts of foreign parties. This Note’s goal, however, is to propose a framework for
interpreting the FCPA rather than to broadly comment on the scope of the Charming Betsy
canon. Because the narrower presumption against extraterritoriality resolves the FCPA’s
ambiguity, see supra Part III.A.2, this Note does not broadly consider customary internationallaw norms.
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territoriality and provides a limiting principle for the scope of the
FCPA. This Note, therefore, urges the application of foreignrelations-law canons of construction, such as those used here, to settle
questions regarding the application of American law abroad and limit
expansive corporate crime statutes’ extraterritorial effects. Although
the presumption against extraterritoriality is best applied to the
FCPA’s provisions, another foreign-relations canon may provide the
answer for a different U.S. statute.

